The Restoration and Protection of Afro-Colombian Land to Establish Equality and Mitigate Violence by Fuentes, Maria Claudia
Emory International Law Review 
Volume 33 Issue 3 
2019 
The Restoration and Protection of Afro-Colombian Land to 
Establish Equality and Mitigate Violence 
Maria Claudia Fuentes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr 
Recommended Citation 
Maria C. Fuentes, The Restoration and Protection of Afro-Colombian Land to Establish Equality and 
Mitigate Violence, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 399 (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss3/3 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
FUENTESCOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19 5/23/2019 10:08 AM 
 
THE RESTORATION AND PROTECTION OF AFRO-
COLOMBIAN LAND TO ESTABLISH EQUALITY AND 
MITIGATE VIOLENCE 
ABSTRACT 
As the Colombian government is attempting to achieve peace in its country 
after fifty-two years of civil conflict, peace will not be attainable unless the 
Colombian government addresses the vulnerable status of Afro-Colombians and 
their land rights in the Pacific region of the country. The vulnerability of Afro-
Colombians and their land rights have greatly impacted the instability in the 
nation. Throughout the civil conflict, numerous bloody skirmishes occurred on 
the arable lands of Afro-Colombian. These bloody skirmishes will continue 
because of the desire of criminal non-government actors to take the arable land 
and use it for profit. Colombian law dictates that before any development occurs 
on their lands, Afro-Colombians must be consulted. This policy is known as 
consulta previa. Criminal non-government actors have attempted to get around 
the consulta previa through violent measures. The Colombian government has 
failed to protect Afro-Colombians and their lands from these non-government 
actors. In turn, the Colombian government has encouraged businesses to seek 
out the arable land for development and has failed to enforce consulta previa. 
This Comment argues that these policies by the Colombian government have left 
Afro-Colombians vulnerable to continued violent attacks by both criminal non-
government actors and businesses that the Colombian government supports. 
This Comment proposes that to protect Afro-Colombians and their lands the 
Colombian government should communicate with Afro-Colombians and 
implement a stronger policy of consulta previa by using the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People as a guideline and by granting Afro-Colombians 
the ability to veto the plans that are presented to them.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Afro-Colombians in the Pacific Region of Colombia have uniquely endured 
violent attacks on their personhood, community, and property throughout the 
country’s history. Unfortunately, this remains the case today, even as many other 
segments of Colombian society have begun to experience the promise of post-
war prosperity and peace.  
In November 2016, the Colombian government and the guerrilla group—
Fuerzas Armadas de Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) signed a peace 
agreement that ended a fifty-two year conflict.1 The Colombian Civil Conflict2 
led to 220,000 deaths, 7 million displacements, and around 33,000 kidnappings.3 
The peace agreement signified many different things for Colombians: the end of 
half a century of bloodshed,4 a boost in the economy,5 and, for internally 
displaced citizens, a chance to return home.6 
For the Colombians who live in major cities, such as Bogotá or Medellín, 
progress from the turmoil has been underway for several years.7 In those cities, 
the occurrence of violent crimes has decreased, and employment opportunities 
 
 1 See Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Colombia’s Civil Conflict, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict; Juan Manuel Santos, The Promise 
of Peace in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/opinion/colombia-
peace-process.html; Joe Parkin, Colombia Peace Process Weather Storm as FARC Hands in Weapons, 
GUARDIAN (June 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/16/colombia-peace-process-farc-
rebels-hand-in-weapons.  
 2 The war between the Colombian government, the FARC and several other insurgency groups during 
1964 to the present day will be referred to as the Colombian Civil Conflict. See Felter & Renwick, supra note 1.  
 3 Nick Miroff, The Staggering Toll of Colombian’s War with the FARC Rebels Explained in Numbers, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/24/the-
staggering-toll-of-colombias-war-with-farc-rebels-explained-in-numbers/?utm_term=.45c53a0cc09b; see also 
Colombia Kidnapping Down 92% since 2000, Police Say, BBC (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-latin-america-38450688.  
 4 See On Victim’s Day, Colombia Marches for Peace, ICTJ, https://www.ictj.org/multimedia/photo/ 
victims-day-colombia-marches-peace (demonstrating that there are Colombians that are skeptical that ending 
the conflict with the FARC will end all the violence in Colombia); Matthew Holmes, Forgiveness Can Change 
A Country: Colombians on Peace Deal Referendum, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2016/oct/01/forgiveness-can-change-a-country-colombians-on-peace-deal-referendum. 
 5 Michelle Caruso-Cabera, Colombian President: Peace Deal Would Boost Economy, CNBC (Oct 1. 
2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/01/colombian-president-peace-deal-would-boost-economy.html.  
 6 Nick Miroff, Colombia’s War Has Displaced 7 million. With Peace, Will They Go Home?, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-
million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_story.html?utm_ 
term=.1756db20a945 [hereinafter Displaced 7 Million]. 
 7 See Nell McShane Wulfhart, 36 Hours in Bogotá, Colombia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/05/travel/what-to-do-in-36-hours-in-bogota-colombia.html. 
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and access to healthcare have increased.8 But for those who live in the Pacific 
Region of Colombia, relief from the turmoil that characterized wartime is 
currently unattainable.  
Peace in the Pacific remains unattainable because violence in the area is 
often connected with the desire for arable land and the facility to take land from 
its occupants.9 The desire for arable land is often manifested through forceful 
land grabs.10 The land can be taken from its occupants due to the lack of 
protections the Colombian government provides the occupants of the Pacific 
Region.11  
Violent forceful acquisitions of arable lands in the Pacific Region did not 
begin with the rise of the guerrillas, and such practices will not be eradicated by 
peace agreements.12 The physical removal of people to acquire arable lands in 
post-Independence Colombia can be traced back to the early 1800s when 
landowners and the Colombian government asserted dominion over lands that 
were inhabited by Afro-Colombians and Indigenous peoples.13 Wealthy 
landowners and the Colombian government pushed several Afro-Colombian 
groups and Indigenous peoples off the land to establish an agricultural industry 
in the area.14 This physical removal detrimentally impacted Afro-Colombians’ 
and Indigenous peoples’ society, independence, and means of survival.15  
The emergences of other violent actors such as the guerrillas, the 
paramiliatares, and the cartels in the Pacific Region contributed to fights over 
lands that have exacerbated the pain of Afro-Colombians and Indigenous 
people,16and interest in the arable lands of the Pacific has not ended. Today, the 
 
 8 See id. Contra Kat Martindale, Researching Cities: Does Bogotá’s transformation hold up to scrutiny, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/oct/10/researching-cities-bogota-
transformation-scrutiny-colombia; see Alex Warnock-Smith, Story of Cities #42: Medellín escapes grip of drug 
lord to embrace radical urbanism, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/may/ 
13/story-cities-pablo-escobar-inclusive-urbanism-medellin-colombia; Ashoka, The Transformation of Medellīn, 
and the Surprising Company Behind It, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2014/01/ 
27/the-transformation-of-medellin-and-the-surprising-company-behind-it/#71a5e58232cc.  
 9 GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000 134 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See id.; Peter Wade, The Cultural Politics of Blackness in Colombia, 22 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 341, 345 
(1995). 
 12 See Wade, supra note 11. 
 13 ANDREWS, supra note 9. 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id.  
 16 Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli, Stopping Irreparable Harm: Acting on Colombia’s Afro-Colombian and 
Indigenous Communities Protection Crisis, NOREF (June 2012), https://noref.no/Publications/Themes/Global-
trends/Stopping-irreparable-harm-acting-on-Colombia-s-Afro-Colombian-and-indigenous-communities-
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fertile land of the Pacific Region is still being fought over because the lucrative 
industry of palm oil cultivation requires rich land.17  
This Comment will focus only on the treatment of the Afro-Colombians of 
the Pacific Region.18 While Indigenous people endured transgressions similar to 
those suffered by the Afro-Colombians, Afro-Colombians are unique in a sense 
that the Colombian government and society historically denied their presence in 
the country.19 Since Afro-Colombians’ status as a distinct group was essentially 
erased from the Colombian society, the Colombian government overlooked the 
unique historical and cultural connection that Afro-Colombians had to the land 
in the Pacific Region and ignored the pain that Afro-Colombians endured.20  
Throughout the battles for land in the Pacific, Afro-Colombians were 
subjected to horrendous acts of both physical and mental depravity: families 
were often removed from their homes at gunpoint; women were often raped; 
and, along with their land, Afro-Colombians lost their independence and 
culture.21  
The Colombian government has attempted to make amends for its past 
behavior of prioritizing economic development over Afro-Colombian land 
rights and, in 1991, began to recognize Afro-Colombians’ ties to certain lands 
in the Pacific Region through the ratification of Law 70 into its Constitution and 
the establishment of consulta previa.22 These laws provided Afro-Colombians 
 
protection-crisis/(language)/eng-US (last updated June 19, 2017). 
 17 Nick Miroff, In Colombia, A Palm Oil Boom with Roots in Conflict, WASH. POST ( Dec. 30, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-colombia-a-palm-oil-boom-has-its-roots-in-years-of-
fighting/2014/12/29/ae6eb10c-796b-11e4-9721-80b3d95a28a9_story.html?utm_term=.62f18a616937 
[hereinafter Palm Oil Boom]; EU Indigenous and Community Palm Oil Tour, BURNESS, 
http://www.burness.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Colombia-Palm-Oil-Brief.pdf [hereinafter BURNESS]; 
see also C. . .sar Augusto Rodriguez-Garavito et al., Racial Discrimination and Human Rights in Colombia: A 
Report on the Situation of the Rights of Afro-Colombians, GLOBAL JUST. SERIES (OBSERVATORY RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION, COLOM.) (Dec. 2008), https://cdn.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/fi_name_ 
recurso_204.pdf. 
 18 For the rest of this Comment, the use of the term Afro-Colombians only refers to Afro-Colombians in 
the Pacific Region. The Colombian government recognizes four distinct classifications of Afro-Colombians: 
those in the Pacific Region, the raizal communities, those from the palenque, and Afro-Colombians who live in 
cities. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [CONSTITUTION] July 4, 1991 [hereinafter CONSTITUTION]; 
see also Sascha Carolina Herrera, A History of Violence and Exclusion: Afro-Colombians From Slavery to 
Displacement (Oct. 31, 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University) (on file at Georgetown 
University). 
 19 See Wade, supra note 11.  
 20 Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17.  
 21 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 134.  
 22 CONSTITUTION, supra note 18; see Diana María Ocampo & Sebastain Agudelo, Country Study: 
Colombia, AM. Q. (Spring 2014); Myriam M. . .ndez-Montalvo, Consulta Previa: A Defining Issue for Latin 
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with collective title to their lands, ensured certain lands rights and recognized 
the past assaults that Afro-Colombians faced on their livelihoods.23 However, 
the Colombian government has failed to establish a clear policy on how to 
reconcile the interests of the agricultural industry with the interests of Afro-
Colombians.24  
If the government does not reinforce the current protections to Afro-
Colombian lands, such as consulta previa, Colombian citizens may continue to 
face more violence as eager business owners and bacrim25 forcibly take Afro-
Colombian land and assassinate Afro-Colombian leaders who attempt to assert 
and protect their land rights.26 To move past the violence of the Colombian Civil 
Conflict, and to truly achieve peace within the nation, the Colombian 
government must prioritize the rights of Afro-Colombians over those of 
corporations by truly recognizing and respecting Afro-Colombians’ rights to 
land.  
Safety in the Pacific will only be possible if the Colombian government does 
four things: (1) moves away from its current loose legal framework of consulta 
previa and stops circumventing consulta previa by (2) communicating with 
Afro-Colombians, (3) using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
(UNDRIP) as a guideline, and (4) granting Afro-Colombians the ability to veto. 
This Comment will advocate for the above proposal while examining the 
attendant obstacles it faces through four interrelated subtopics: Part I will detail 
a brief history of Afro-Colombians in the Pacific Region and the origins of the 
modern land-rights dispute. Part II will describe the current system of laws 
 
America, FORD FOUND.: EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-
change-blog/posts/consulta-previa-a-defining-issue-for-latin-america/ (noting that consulta previa, generally, is 
“the right of indigenous and ethnic communities to be consulted on matters affecting their culture and heritage.”); 
see also Wade, supra note 11 (discussing Law 70 and its exclusions); Indigenous Peoples and Minorities Section, 
U.N. Office High Comm’r Hum. Rts. [OHCHR] Rule of Law, Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous 
People (Sept. 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/FreePriorandInformedConsent.pdf. In 
Colombia, indigenous and ethnic communities have certain rights over traditional or ancestral lands. Consulta 
previa in Colombia dictates that the indigenous or ethnic community who have rights to a certain area of land 
are consulted when companies or the government wish to use the land. Id. at 1.  
 23 See Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16. In the Pacific, Afro-Colombian communities in Antioquia, Valle 
del Cauca, Nariño, Chocó, Cauca, and Risaralda, collectively, were granted 159 land titles, spanning over 5.2 
million hectares, by the Colombian government. Id.  
 24 See Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17.  
 25 Emerging criminal bands and new paramilitaries are known by the Colombian government as “bacrim.” 
Bacrim are sometimes hired by corporations as agents for the removal of lands or the protection of land. See 
Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16.  
 26 Dan Kovalik, Colombia: Ethnocide and Political Violence on the Rise, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Mar. 
28, 2016, 9:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-kovalik/colombia-ethnocide—polit_b_9556570.html 
(last updated Dec. 6, 2017); see also Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17.  
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protecting Afro-Colombians’ title to property. Part III will address problems 
with the current system, and Part IV will propose changes that will enable the 
system to provide more protections to Afro-Colombians. Part V will address 
criticisms to the general concept of consulta previa.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AFRO-COLOMBIANS IN THE PACIFIC  
The Pacific Region of Colombia is a predominately rural area that lacks 
access to infrastructure, healthcare, and education.27 Home to the departments 
of Choco, Valle de Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño,28 the region is inhabited primarily 
by Afro-Colombians, who make up ninety percent of the population.29 The 
presence of Afro-Colombians in this area dates back to the 1500s.30 To 
understand why Afro-Colombians have collective title to certain land and to 
appreciate the connection between Afro-Colombian land and the violent land-
grabs by paramilitares and guerrillas, a brief history is necessary. This section 
will discuss four different time periods of Colombian history. The first section 
will discuss the arrival of African slaves to Colombia and their role in 
Colombian independence from Spain. The second section will discuss the 
development of the Afro-Colombian society. The third section will look at the 
destabilizing impact of guerrillas and paramilitaries on Colombia and Afro-
Colombians. The fourth section will discuss how Afro-Colombians gained 
recognition by the government and were granted certain rights that protected 
their land and their culture.  
A. Independence and Freedom 
In the 1500s, Africans arrived in the Pacific Region of Colombia through the 
transatlantic slave trade.31 Spaniards enslaved Africans and exploited their labor 
 
 27 Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17.  
 28 STATOID, DEPARTMENTS OF COLOMBIA, http://www.statoids.com/uco.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2018); 
see also Wade, supra note 11. 
 29 Afro-Colombians, MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT’L., http://minorityrights.org/minorities/afro-colombians/ 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2018).  
 30 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 17. 
 31 Id.; see also Herbert S. Klein & Ben Vinson III, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN (Oxford Univ. Press 2007 (discussing the transatlantic slave trade and the impact on Latin America).  
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in gold mines, sugar haciendas,32 and cattle farms.33 Some Africans and their 
descendants were able to achieve freedom prior to emancipation.34 African 
slaves, free blacks, 35 and mulattos36 would play an integral role in the fight for 
independence against Spain that began in the 1800s.37 Their involvement in the 
fight for independence would impact their status in society. During the battles 
for independence, gradual emancipation efforts occurred in liberated territories 
that were no longer under Spanish rule.38 Emancipation, however, faced heavy 
resistance from wealthy landowners, and slavery in the area would not officially 
end until 1851.39  
During the slow process of emancipation, libertos40 sought “to redefine their 
living and working conditions in such a way as to negate and obliterate the 
 
 32 A hacienda is “an agricultural estate, operated by a dominant landowner and a dependent labor force, 
organized to supply a small market by means of scarce capital, in which the factors of production are employed 
not for capital accumulation but also to support the status aspirations of the owner.” See GRETA-FRIEDMAN 
SÁNCHEZ, ASSEMBLING FLOWERS AND CULTIVATING HOMES: LABOR AND GENDER IN COLOMBIA 14 (Lexington 
Books 2006) (quoting Eric Wolf & Sindey Mintz, Haciendas and Plantations in Middle America and the 
Caribbean, 6 SOC. ECON. STUD. 380, 412 (1957)). 
 33 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 17; Herrera, supra note 18.  
 34 See Marixa Lasso, MYTHS OF HARMONY: RACE AND REPUBLICANISM DURING THE AGE OF 
REVOLUTION, COLOMBIA 1795 – 1831(Univ. Pittsburgh Press 2007) (referring to free blacks); see also Peter 
Wade, Afro-Colombian Social Movements, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON AFRO-LATIN AMERICA (Univ. 
Press of Florida 2012). Africans and their descendants who achieved freedom prior to emancipation will be 
referred to as free blacks. See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 17. 
 35 See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 17. The term “free blacks” is used in reference to African slaves who 
had runaway or had been freed. Id. 
 36 See id. Over the ensuing centuries, African slaves and their descendants would intermarry with both 
European and Indigenous populations, becoming part of a racial classification system unique to the Spanish 
colonies in the Americas, with each racial classification bringing corresponding rights and privileges. Id. at 56. 
George Reid Andrews uses “mulatto” to describe someone of “known African ancestry,” and this Comment 
adopts that classification. Id. at 5. However, mulatto is commonly used to refer to someone with African and 
European ancestry. Mulatto, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2017).  
 37 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 56. Simon Bolivar, one of the leaders of the independence movement, 
originally did not think it was necessary to include the emancipation of the slaves in his nation-building project. 
See Aline Helg, Simón Bolívar and the Spectre of Pardocracia: Jos. . . Padilla in Post-Independence Cartagena, 
35 J. Latin American Studies 447, 449-450 (2003); see also Ishaan Tharoor, Simón Bolívar: The Latin American 
Hero Many Americans Don’t Know, TIME (May 13, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/05/31/simon-bolivar-
the-latin-american-hero-many-americans-dont-know/. As the war for independence went on, Bolivar realized 
that if the struggle for independence was to succeed, slavery would need to end. Id. At one point, Bolivar was 
given sanctuary in Haiti, and his discussions with Haitian President Alexandre P. . .tion influenced Bolivar’s 
position towards slavery. Id. 
 38 See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 57. These policies were called libertad de vientres—”Freedom of the 
Womb Laws.” Id.  
 39 Id. at 56. Colombia officially recognizes May 21, 1851 as the official day slavery ended. See Oliver 
Sheldon, Afro-Colombian Day: An Opportunity to Celebrate Culture and Equality, COLOMBIA REPORTS (May 
21, 2014), https://colombiareports.com/colombia-celebrates-afro-colombian-day/.  
 40 “Libertos” is the term used to refer to black slaves who fought in the wars of independence and became 
free upon military service. See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 62. 
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experience of slavery.”41 One way the libertos in the Pacific Region attempted 
to solidify their freedom was through the acquisition and ownership of land.42 
Through the land ownership, libertos found the opportunity to survive without 
having to work on a hacienda as cheap labor43 and the ability to provide shelter 
and food for their families.44 
Land after independence was also easily accessible.45 Instability within the 
country had caused crop cultivation and mining to slow down, leading the 
owners of haciendas and mines to leave their lands and move to cities.46 Libertos 
and other African descendants who did not move to cities would move on to not 
only these lands but also on to properties that had been abandoned by the Spanish 
crown but not yet reallocated by the new government.47 Several of the black 
families who moved onto these abandoned lands requested grants of title from 
the government. Most of the requests were denied or ignored.48 Yet, the 
government took no formal steps to remove the families from the area.49 These 
families would stay on the lands undeterred by the lack of government 
recognition.50  
One reason for the government’s lack of effort to remove Afro-Colombians 
from the land, was the instability in the government.51 There were ongoing 
disagreements about the nature of the nascent government and its boundaries; 
and eventually, Venezuela and Ecuador would leave Gran Colombia to form 
their own states.52 Following the secession of Venezuela and Ecuador, the 
Republic of New Granada came into existence.53 Yet disagreements over the 
new government continued. Wealthy landowners through their different political 
 
 41 Id. at 102–03.  
 42 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 102–03; Herrera, supra note 18.  
 43 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 102–03.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id.; Herrera, supra note 18.  
 46 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 102–03; Herrera, supra note 18. 
 47 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 102–03.  
 48 Id.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id.  
 51 Fernán E. González, The Colombian Conflict in Historical Perspective, 14 ACCORD 10, 15 (2004), 
http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/colombian-conflict-historical-perspective. Gran Colombia was comprised of 
modern-day Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador. See Gran Colombia, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 
(July 22, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/place/Gran-Colombia. 
 52 Harvey F. Kline et al., Colombia: Revolution and Independence, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Feb. 
26, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/place/Colombia/Revolution-and-independence. 
 53 González, supra note 51. The Republic of New Granada encompassed modern day Colombia and 
Panama. Viceroyalty of New Granada, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.britannica. 
com/place/Viceroyalty-of-New-Granada. 
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parties, el partido liberal and el partido conservador, would cause the state to 
go through several civil wars and constitutional changes.54  
Following independence, the dispute between wealthy landowners over 
governance dominated the political sphere of Colombia.55 These wealthy 
landowners fought for control of the Colombian government and caused the 
government’s attention and resources to focus on the major cities, leaving those 
in the countryside, like the Afro-Colombians, to fend for themselves.56 The lack 
of presence from the Colombian government allowed Afro-Colombians to live 
on abandoned land undisturbed for around one hundred years.57 This time spent 
isolated from the rest of the country is one of the reasons for the creation of Law 
70 and the practice of consulta previa.58 Both policies acknowledge the different 
history of Afro-Colombians and attempt to protect their culture.59  
B. Development of Afro-Colombian Society Post-Independence 
As the Colombian state was forming, Afro-Colombians were mostly ignored 
by the Colombian leadership.60 This allowed the Afro-Colombians who moved 
onto abandoned land in the Pacific to develop a socio-economic structure of their 
own, entitled troncos.61 Troncos (tree trunks) dictated the use and allocation of 
land by using a system based on inheritance, in which the families who first 
arrived and cleared the land, received a portion of that land and that portion was 
passed on to other family members.62 Family members had a right to reside, 
work, and inherit the minas (mines), which were mining lands, and the 
chagras—the ancestral land used for agriculture and cattle, which consisted of 
 
 54 See id. at 10, 12–13. List of wars: La Violencia (1948–1958), Guerra Civil (1860–1862), Guerra Civil 
de 1876, Guerra de los Mil Días (1899–1902). Timeline of Colombian governments: República de la Nueva 
Granada (1831–1858), Confederación Granadina (1858–1863), Estados Unidos de Colombia (1863–1886), 
República de Colombia (1886–present day). The disputes between wealthy landowners will be discussed in more 
detail later.  
 55 See Herrera, supra note 18, at 28.  
 56 Id.  
 57 See Wade, supra note 11, at 345. 
 58 See L. 70, agosto 27, 1993, DIARIO OFFICIAL [D.O], translated in Norma & Peter Jackson, Law 70 
of Colombia (1993): In Recognition of the Right of Black Colombians to Collectively Own and Occupy their 
Ancestral Lands., Benedict College (1993), www.benedict.edu/exec_admin/intnl_programs/other_files/bc-
intnl_programs-law_70_of_colombia-english.pdf; Herrera, supra note 18, at 16–34. 
 59 See L. 70, supra note 58; Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22. 
 60 See id.  
 61 See Herrera, supra note 18, at 19; Stella Rodriguez, Fronteras Fijas, Valor De Cambio y Cultivos 
Ilícitos en el Pacífico Caucano de Colombia [Fixed Frontiers, Exchange Value and Illicit Crops in the Colombian 
Pacific Coast], 44 REVISTA COLOMBIANA DE ANTROPOLOGÍA 42, 47–48 (2008). 
 62 Rodriguez, supra note 61, at 48.  
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land used for agriculture.63 The right could be inherited from the paternal or the 
maternal side, depending on the choice of the one exercising the right.64 The 
system also had rules on how to rent and sell land.65 As well as what happened 
to the land during certain life events such as divorce or migration.66 During this 
time, Afro-Colombians mainly lived off subsistence agriculture, fishing, 
logging, and mining.67  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, changes to the Afro-Colombian 
way of life and the troncos system that governed their lives were under increased 
threat from outside forces.68 Colombia began to export coffee bringing more 
wealth into the country and renewing interest in the fertile Pacific Region.69 The 
Colombian government and wealthy landowners returned to the Pacific Region 
to reclaim the land that they had previously abandoned to use for the cultivation 
of cash crops.70 Together, the government and wealthy landowners acted in 
conjunction to remove, often violently, the Afro-Colombians from the lands they 
had lived and worked on for generations.71 These forced seizures reduced many 
Afro-Colombians from landowners to mere tenants of their own homes and 
wage-laborers on their own lands.72 Dispossession was enhanced by the creation 
of a railroad that went from Cali to the Pacific coast.73 As these newly-arrived 
landowners continued to increase their wealth and influence in the region, the 
status of Afro-Colombians diminished.74  
During the 1940s, Afro-Colombians faced another threat to their way of 
living. The Colombian Government initiated a credit program that attempted to 
regulate land tenure and titling leading to a “massive exploitation of wood, cattle 
ranching, oil palm plantations, and shrimp ponds.”75 Some Afro-Colombians 
applied for these loans to engage in the agricultural and logging industries but 
 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 Herrera, supra note 18, at 2.  
 68 See id. 
 69 See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 117, 134.  
 70 See id. at 134; see also Wade, supra note 11, at 345 (discussing the Colombian government’s hands-
off approach to the Pacific Region). 
 71 See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 134.  
 72 See Herrera, supra note 18, at 26, 30.  
 73 ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 134.  
 74 See. id.  
 75 Herrera, supra note 18, at 25 (citing GENTE NEGRA EN COLOMBIA: DINÁMICAS SOCIOPOLITICAS EN 
CALI Y EL PACIFICO 206 (Oliver Barbary & Fernando Urrera eds. 2004)).  
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also as a means of regaining their land.76 However, they were frequently 
outcompeted by corporate agricultural and logging operations, and often lost 
their territory to foreclosure.77  
While isolated from the rest of the country, Afro-Colombians created a 
culture and, with the establishment of troncos, a system that was distinctly 
theirs.78 Yet, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Afro-Colombians saw 
their lives change drastically.79 The society that they had developed was 
impacted by the sudden incursion of the government and wealthy landowners, 
as many of Afro-Colombians were forcibly moved off their lands for the sake of 
government sponsored, private-economic activities.80 These activities, justified 
as economic development initiatives, negatively affected Afro-Colombians and 
their culture.81 Indeed, the disastrous impact of government development 
projects and outside private enterprise on Afro-Colombian society has been 
formally recognized by the Colombian government, as demonstrated by the 
adoption of Law 70 and consulta previa.82 These laws were designed to formally 
recognize past harmful practices and ensure their discontinuation.83 
C. Guerrillas & Paramilitaries 
Afro-Colombians, already suffering from the loss of their lands, also had to 
contend with the disastrous consequences of another Colombian civil war: La 
Violencia.84 The war formally lasted for a ten-year period, but its destabilizing 
effects continue to impact Colombia today.85 La Violencia began in 1948 and 
lasted until 1958. During that period, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, 
and Communist supporters fought throughout the Colombian countryside, 
leading to the death of around 200,000 people.86 During this time, Afro-
 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. 
 78 See Herrera, supra note 18, at 19–21. 
 79 Id. at 24. 
 80 Id. at 26–26. 
 81 Id.  
 82 See L. 70, supra note 58; Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22. 
 83 Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22. 
 84 La Violencia is the term used to refer to the civil war of 1948-1958. See William Paul McGreevey, et. 
al., Colombia: La Violencia, Dictatorship, and Democratic Restoration, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Colombia/La-Violencia-dictatorship-and-democratic-restoration. 
 85 Id. Following La Violencia, the communist supporters fled to rural areas of Colombia and began the 
FARC. See Felter & Renwick, supra note 1.  
 86 McGreevey, supra note 84; see also World Peace Found., Colombia: La Violencia, MASS ATROCITY 
ENDINGS (Dec. 14, 2016), https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/colombia-la-violencia-2/.  
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Colombians, although isolated, were not immune from the turmoil that engulfed 
the rest of the country.87  
Following the formal end of La Violencia, peasants in the countryside who 
had mobilized to ward off the violence turned into the guerrilla group FARC.88 
Over time more guerrilla groups would form such as the Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN), the M-19, and the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL).89 
These guerrilla groups instigated violence throughout the country.90 In response, 
landowners and wealthy businessmen, with the support of the Colombian 
government, created right-wing paramilitary organizations to protect their 
interests.91 The emerging mosaic of violent confrontations between the 
numerous armed groups in Colombia grew more dire and more complicated with 
the development of the drug trade and the drug cartels. In the 1970s, marijuana 
growth in Colombia bred “nouveau riche” drug traffickers, which turned into the 
drug cartels of Medellin and Cali.92 As the drug cartels grew more powerful, 
some drug traffickers created their own paramilitary groups to acquire more land 
to grow coca and marijuana.93  
The arable lands of the Pacific were useful in the cultivation of coca and 
marijuana and many Afro-Colombians were once again dispossessed of their 
lands — this time to make way for drug cultivation.94 Certain guerrillas became 
involved in the drug trade, which caused problems between the cartels and the 
guerrillas.95 The Medellin Cartel’s paramilitary arm began to work with the 
Colombian government to fight off the guerrillas.96 Yet, the Medellin Cartel and 
the Colombian government would also continue to fight amongst each other.97 
While the battles between the guerrillas, paramilitaries, cartels and the 
Colombian military occurred throughout the entire country, they were especially 
frequent on and near land inhabited by Afro-Colombians.98  
 
 87 See McGreevey, supra note 84.  
 88 See Lawrence Boudon, Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process, 
28 J. LATIN-AMERICAN STUD. 279, 280 (1996).  
 89 Id.  
 90 See Boudon, supra note 88, at 280; see also Winfred Tate, Paramilitaries in Colombia, 8 BROWN J. 
WORLD AFF. 163, 164 (2001). 
 91 See Tate, supra note 90, at 194–95; see also González, supra note 51.  
 92 Tate, supra note 90, at 165; see also González, supra note 51, at 13.  
 93 Tate, supra note 90, at 165.  
 94 Id.; see also González, supra note 51, at 13.  
 95 Felter & Renwick, supra note 1; see Tate, supra note 90, at 165; see also González , supra note 51, at 
13–14.  
 96 Tate, supra note 90, at 166.  
 97 Id.  
 98 Herrera, supra note 13, at 3–4, 103. 
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To contextualize the current threats that Afro-Colombians face today, one 
needs to understand the destabilizing effects that the rise of the cartels— in 
combination with the presence of guerrillas and paramilitares— had on Afro-
Colombians and the entire country. The arable land of the Pacific was a vital 
commodity for these groups and led to numerous battles over the control of the 
land.99 These fights caused the displacement of thousands of Colombians, 
especially Afro-Colombians, who fled into overcrowded cities.100 The turmoil 
directly impacted the lives of Afro-Colombians, as many saw family members 
and friends die during land disputes.101 The constant struggle between the 
cartels, guerrillas, and paramilitares for control of fertile land with the capacity 
of drug cultivation was one of the main reasons Afro-Colombians lost such a 
vast amount of their land and their cohesiveness as a community.102 As efforts 
to restore Afro-Colombians’ land rights occur under the authority of Law 70 and 
through the implementation of consulta previa, these actors continue to present 
a direct threat against that initiative.103  
D. Recognition 
By the end of the twentieth century, the Colombian Civil Conflict had 
devastated the lives of countless Afro-Colombians.104 The fights between the 
guerrillas, paramilitares, the cartels, and the Colombian government were often 
fought directly on their lands.105 With continuing loss of control of their lands, 
Afro-Colombians had to seek other avenues for sustenance and shelter. Some 
Afro-Colombians got involved in the drug trade or joined either guerrillas or 
paramilitary groups.106  
Afro-Colombians who stayed in the region endured numerous traumatic 
events such as violence, displacement, and loss of family members.107 These 
 
 99 Hisham Aidi, Afro-Colombians Face Surge in Racial Violence, AL JAZEERA (July 18, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/afro-colombians-face-surge-racial-violence-150707094927 
679.html. 
 100 Louise Højen, Colombia’s “Invisible Crisis”: Internally Displaced Persons, COUNCIL HEMISPHERIC 
AFF. (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.coha.org/colombias-invisible-crisis-internally-displaced-persons/. Afro-
Colombians fled the area to overcrowded cities, adding to the number of internally displaced people and creating 
more problems for the government. See Displaced 7 Million, supra note 6.  
 101 Aidi, supra note 99.  
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. Guerrillas, paramilitaries, cartels, and the Colombian government are all threats to Afro-Colombian 
restoration of land. Id.  
 104 Displaced 7 Million, supra note 6. 
 105 Afro-Colombians, supra note 29.  
 106 Id. Some Afro-Colombians would also join the Colombian military. Id.  
 107 See Displaced 7 Million, supra note 6; Aidi, supra note 99, Afro-Colombians, supra note 29. 
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traumatic events exacerbated the condition of Afro-Colombians who did not 
have access to substantial social resources.108 Compared to other parts of the 
country during the 1990s, the Pacific was considerably more impoverished and 
less attended to by the national government.109 The area lacked paved roads, and 
in certain parts, like Choco, Afro-Colombians traveled in raft-like boats along 
river channels.110 This created problems when violence broke out and Afro-
Colombians attempted to flee.111 The lack of roads also made access to health 
care difficult;112 this was particularly damaging considering the pre-existing 
health risks created by the “scarcity of running water, potable water and sewage 
systems” in this area.113 With so many issues plaguing the Pacific, Afro-
Colombians felt abandoned by the rest of their country.114  
Seeking to reinforce democracy and stabilize the country after all the 
violence during the Colombian Civil Conflict, government officials sought to 
enact a new constitution.115  
Once they learned of the potential for a new constitution, Afro-Colombians 
began to mobilize and attempted to acquire representation in the constitutional 
assembly.116 Their platform was based on the desire to regain the stability that 
they once had during the troncos era, and to regain that stability, they sought 
title to the ancestral lands that they had called home since independence in the 
1800s.117 However, their land claim was rejected because the Colombian 
Institute for Agrarian Reform would not recognize Afro-Colombians as an 
 
 108 See Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17, at 48.  
 109 See Wade, supra note 11, at 342 
 110 James Brooke, Long Neglected, Colombia’s Blacks Win Changes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/29/world/long-neglected-colombia-s-blacks-win-changes.html?pagewanted= 
all.  
 111 Afro-Colombians and Indigenous Groups at Risk From Fresh Fighting, UNHCR (Nov. 3, 2006), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2006/11/454b48392/afro-colombians-indigenous-groups-risk-fresh-
fighting.html. The article mentions the difficulties that Embera families, who are indigenous, have had fleeing 
while on rafts. Id. Yet Afro-Colombians in the Choco area also use boats to travel and face similar attacks, they 
also have encountered the difficulties of fleeing from violence while on a raft. Id.  
 112 See Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17, at 48. The difficult Colombian terrain and the internal 
conflicts also exasperate the health care problems. Id.  
 113 Id.  
 114 Brooke, supra note 110. 
 115 Donald T. Fox, et al., Lessons of the Colombian Constitutional Reform of 1991: Toward the Securing 
Peace and Reconciliation, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION 
MAKING 467, 470 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010); see also Wade, supra note 11, at 346 (discussing how 
constitutional reform was a concession during the peace talks with the guerrilla group, M-19). Another positive 
measure for Afro-Colombians was that the Constitutional Court outlawed CONVIVIR, a right-wing paramilitary 
group in 1997. See Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16, at 2.  
 116 Yesenia Barragan, To End 500 Years of Great Terror, 49 NACLA REP. AM. 56, 58–59 (Mar. 14, 2017).  
 117 Dixon, supra note 115; see also Herrera, supra note 18, at 28; Rodriguez, supra note 61, at 48–49. 
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ethnic community, which was a pre-requisite to receive collective title.118 In 
response, Afro-Colombian communities collected signatures and protested the 
rejection by peacefully occupying government buildings in Quibdo.119  
These protests were impactful; thus, in 1993, the Colombian government 
enacted Law 70 to the 1991 Constitution, adding language that recognized the 
existence of Afro-Colombians.120 Never before had the Colombian government 
acknowledged the existence of Afro-Colombians and their distinct cultural 
identity until the passing of Law 70.121 Law 70 bound the Colombian 
government by granting protected rights to Ethnic communities, including Afro-
Colombians122 The law also granted specific land rights to Afro-Colombians.123 
More information on Law 70 will be provided in the next section of this 
Comment.  
The hope that recognition by the government and the establishment of 
collective title to land would bring about change died quickly. Even in recent 
decades, Afro-Colombians continue to face terrible violence. One example is the 
massacre in Bojayá where, on May 2, 2002, seventy-nine people were killed in 
the crossfires of a fight between paramilitaries and the FARC.124  
Furthermore, the perpetrators of violent land acquisition in the Pacific 
Region have a new motivation: the cultivation of African oil palms.125 Oil palm 
production has now become a lucrative business in Colombia, particularly in the 
Pacific Region, where most of the product is grown.126 Colombia is currently 
Latin America’s largest producer of oil palms.127 The cultivation of oil palm has 
helped boost the Colombian economy,128 and, as a result, the Colombian 
government plans to increase production “six-fold by 2020.”129 Yet, the 
 
 118 Dixon, supra note 115.  
 119 Id. Quibdo is the capital of Chocó. Quibdo, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
place/Quibdo. 
 120 L. 70, supra note 58; see also Tianna S. Paschel, The Right to Difference: Explaining Colombia’s Shift 
From Color Blindness to the Law of Black Communities, 116 AM. J. SOC. 729, 730 (2010).  
 121 Paschel, supra note 121 (discussing Colombian “color-blindness”); see also WADE, supra note 11, at 
349 (discussing how Afro-Colombians were no longer invisible following the implementation of Law 70).  
 122 L. 70, supra note 58; see also WADE, supra note 11, at 349 (discussing Law 70 and its exclusions).  
 123 L. 70, supra note 58; see also WADE, supra note 11, at 349.  
 124 Sofía del Carril & Míriam Juan-Torres, Peace in Colombia: The Tale of Bojayá, YALE J. INT’L AFF. 
(Apr. 6, 2016), http://yalejournal.org/photo-essay_post/peace-in-colombia-the-tale-of-bojaya/. The Colombian 
military arrived four days later. Id.; see Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16, at 2.  
 125 Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17. 
 126 Id  
 127 Id. 
 128 Id.  
 129 Aditi Sen & Stephanie Burgos, The Next Frontier for Palm Oil Expansion: Latin America, OXFAM: 
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cultivation of oil palms presents a problem for Afro-Colombians and their goal 
to regain control of their lands, as well as preserve their culture.130  
While violent and illegal land grabs in the Pacific were often for the 
cultivation of illicit crops, there has recently been a rise of interested actors131 
forcibly taking land for oil palm cultivation.132 Several townspeople have been 
violently forced off their lands, and their towns have been demolished to make 
room for the cultivation of African oil palms.133 These forced removals are often 
performed by bacrim who are paid by corporations that ultimately reap the 
benefits of forced removals in the form of free fertile land.134  
One such town located in the center of Colombia, Mapiripán, was under the 
control of the FARC when it was attacked during July of 1997.135 A week later, 
the town stood in shambles after a fight between paramilitaries and the FARC. 
Towns people, who were caught amongst the crossfire, “[were] torn limb from 
limb while still alive.”136 Following the massacre, most of the town’s citizens 
fled to nearby cities.137 Cecila Lozano was one of those who fled Mapiripán.138 
She never understood why her town was attacked until she returned home, two 
years later, and saw her home replaced by oil palm groves.139 
Jiguamiandó and Curvaradó are two Afro-Colombian areas where 
displacement of Afro-Colombians has occurred to accommodate the production 
 
THE POLITICS OF POVERTY (Oct. 26, 2016), https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/10/the-next-
frontier-for-palm-oil-expansion-latin-america/.  
 130 See Urlich Oslender, Violence in Development: The Logic of Forced Displacement on Colombia’s 
Pacific Coast, 17 DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE 752 (2007). 
 131 Interested persons can include: corporations, paramilitaries (or now bacrim) and guerrillas.  
 132 Hannah Brock, Marginalisation of the Majority World: Drivers of Insecurity and the Global South, 
OXFORD RES. GRP. (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/marginalisation-of-the-majority-
world-drivers-of-insecurity-and-the-global-south (citing Amira Armenta, Marginalisation of the Majority 
World: Crime and Insecurity in Colombia, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE); see also Palm Oil Boom, supra note 
12. 
 133 María Cristana Caballero, Mapiripan: A Shortcut to Hell, CTR PUB. INTEGRITY (July 28, 1997, 6:49 
PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/1997/07/28/3357/mapiripan-shortcut-hell.  
 134 See Resisting Displacement by Combatants and Developers: Humanitarian Zones in North-West 
Colombia, NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL (Nov. 2007), http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/ 
publications/2007/200711-Dam-colombia-resisting-displacement-by-combatants-and-developers-country-
en.pdf [hereinafter Resisting Displacement].  
 135 Caballero, supra note 110.  
 136 Id.  
 137 Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17; see also BURNESS, supra note 17.  
 138 Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17. 
 139 Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17; see BURNESS, supra note 17; see also Oil Palm Cultivation (Palm Oil) 
Guide, AGRIFARMING, http://www.agrifarming.in/oil-palm-cultivation/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).  
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of oil palms.140 The displacement of Afro-Colombians in Jiguamiandó and 
Curvaradó began in the 1990s when farmers and landowners, who received 
financial backing from the illegal drug trade, “used threats and harassment to 
banish the [Afro-Colombians] and appropriate their land.”141 Once Afro-
Colombians fled their land, oil palm plantations took the place of Afro-
Colombian homes.142  
As seen by the land grabs in Jiguamiandó and Curvaradó, other Afro-
Colombian communities are likely to experience what the people of Mariripan 
underwent: a complete loss of their homes through violent land acquisition as 
the Colombian government encourages the development of African oil palms in 
the country. While the people of Mapiripán are not Afro-Colombian, their 
experience demonstrates a common phenomenon in Colombia: the taking of 
land for lucrative industries.  
With the rise of the oil palm industry, Afro-Colombians not only fear attacks 
over the acquisition of their land but also intimidation or retaliation against their 
community leaders.143 Throughout the intersecting histories of the Afro-
Colombian struggle for collective lands rights and the growth of the oil palm 
sector, several Afro-Colombian leaders have been assassinated.144 In February 
of 1996, Francisco Hurtado, a legal representative elected for the council of the 
lower Mira River was murdered.145 The man who shot Hurtado is reported to 
have said “why don’t you continue screwing around with this business of your 
Law 70!”146 In 2008, a leader of a community council in the Mira Region was 
assassinated.147 A note threatening the community to end its activism was found 
near the body.148  
While the Colombian government has initiated policies to protect Afro-
Colombian land rights and culture, these policies fall short.149 The Colombian 
government’s encouragement of the oil palm industry and the desire of 
businessmen, as well as bacrim,150 to make money off the crop, has perpetuated 
 
 140 Brock, supra note 132, at 6–7; see also BURNESS, supra note 17.  
 141 Brock, supra note 132, at 6–7; see also BURNESS, supra note 17. 
 142 Brock, supra note 132, at 6–7; see also BURNESS, supra note 17. 
 143 BURNESS, supra note 17. 
 144 See Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17, at 37; see also Asesinado líder afro en Nariño, AGENCIA 
PRENSA RURAL (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article22624.  
 145 Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17, at 37.  
 146 Id.  
 147 Id.  
 148 Id.  
 149 See Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16, at 2. 
 150 Emerging criminal bands and new paramilitaries are known by the Colombian government as “bacrim.” 
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the violent acquisitions of Afro-Colombian land. Without stability in the region, 
there can be no meaningful improvements to healthcare or infrastructure. More 
importantly, unless the government acts on the promise of Law 70 and consulta 
previa by enforcing Afro-Colombian collective land rights, the incentive for 
armed groups to forcibly take lands from those with no enforceable claims will 
remain and the violence that Afro-Colombians have endured for decades will 
not end.151  
II. PROTECTIONS OF LAND  
To rectify the years of government neglect of Afro-Colombians and the 
abuse Afro-Colombians have faced throughout their history, the Colombian 
government has signed treaties and created laws that recognize Afro-
Colombians as a distinct ethnic community in Colombia.152 These laws compel 
the government to consider the land rights of Afro-Colombians. This section will 
look at the laws that the Colombian government has enacted to rectify the 
mistreatment of Afro-Colombians. First, this section will look at the legal 
framework that recognizes Afro-Colombians as a distinct group in Colombia 
and establishes a system of consultation between Afro-Colombians, the 
government, and corporations. Second, this section will look at this system of 
consulta previa, which ensures that Afro-Colombians have a say on what occurs 
on their lands.  
A. Creation of Protections for Afro-Colombians  
The Colombian government has made progress from its past practice of 
ignoring the presence and plight of Afro-Colombians in the country to 
acknowledging Afro-Colombian’s territorial and cultural identity. The 
Colombian government’s recognition of Afro-Colombians began in the early 
1990s.153 In 1991, the Colombian government signed a new constitution, which 
established protections for the cultural identity of ethnic communities.154 Afro-
Colombians fell under the broad description of “ethnic communities.” Shortly 
after the new constitution went into effect, the Colombian government ratified 
the International Labour Organization convention on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples (ILO 169) which guaranteed the right of indigenous peoples by 
 
Bacrim are sometimes hired by corporations as agents for the removal of lands or the protection of land. See 
Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 61, at 2.  
 151 Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17; see also BURNESS, supra note 17. 
 152 L. 70, supra note 58.  
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. 
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requiring their free, prior, and informed consent before actions occurred on their 
land.155 Then in 1993, the Colombian government adopted ILO 169 into its own 
laws with the passage of Law 70.156  
While ILO 169 detailed the rights of indigenous peoples, Colombia’s Law 
70 expanded the scope of ILO 169 to embrace other ethnic communities, 
including Afro-Colombians of the Pacific Region. Law 70 acknowledged that 
Afro-Colombians had been living in rural areas of the Pacific and independently 
governing themselves under the troncos system.157 The Law established that 
Afro-Colombians had a right to collective title on the lands that they had 
traditionally inhabited.158 Because of Afro-Colombians’ rights to ancestral 
lands, the Colombian government and corporations would now have to consult 
with Afro-Colombians prior to any use of Afro-Colombian land.159 The law also 
mandated that each enclave of Afro-Colombians establish a community council 
that would represent their area during these consultations.160 The process of 
consultation between ethnic groups and corporations is known as consulta 
previa among the Spanish speaking Latin-American countries or free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC), in English.161  
With these laws, Colombia has some of the most progressive declarations 
for ethnic communities in Latin America.162 However, these progressive 
declarations belie the unwillingness of the Colombian government to enforce 
these rights.  
B. Current System of Consulta Previa  
To understand the potential pitfalls of consulta previa, it is important to have 
a basic understanding of how the consultation process is supposed to work. Even 
 
 155 Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) dictates that indigenous groups or ethnic communities must 
first consent to acts by third parties, such as industries on their lands, before third parties proceed to act. FPIC 
ensures that indigenous or ethnic communities have a voice in what occurs on their lands. See Int’l Lab. Org. 
[ILO], Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, pt. II, ILO No. 169 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991), 
http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/C169-Indigenous-and-Tribal-Peoples-Convention.pdf 
[hereinafter ILO No. 169]; see also OHCHR, supra note 22. 
 156 L. 70, supra note 58. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. See also: Beyond Slavery pg. 179. 
 159 L. 70, supra note 58. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Carlos Andr. . .s Baquero Díaz, Contested Lands Contested Laws: What’s Going Wrong in South 
America with the Development and Application of the Domestic Laws to Implement, AM. Q. 107 (Spring 2014), 
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though the consultation process is much more of a unilateral process where the 
corporations have most the bargaining power. The process, at least conceptually, 
happens in three phases: filing, consultation, and monitoring. Criticisms of the 
system will be discussed in the next section, but it is important to note that the 
system of consulta previa was primarily developed by the Constitutional Court, 
and the framework created by the case law has not been respected by 
corporations or bacrim, who often ignore the process altogether.163  
Colombia’s filing process is emblematic of the investor-oriented approach 
the country has taken to consulta previa. In Colombia, consulta previa depends 
on the initiative of a potential investor or organization.164 The potential investor 
or organization recognizes whether consulta previa may be necessary and files 
a project request with the Dirección de Consulta Previa (DCP).165 The DCP 
ensures that the project request was properly filed.166 Once the request is 
properly filed, the DCP determines whether the project will require consulta 
previa. This step may require a visit to the area involved.167 At some point, the 
DCP begins to contact the ethnic or indigenous group.168 If the communities do 
not respond, the DCP turns to the Defensoría del Pueblo,169 Procuraduría 
General de la Nacion,170 and the Instituto Colombiano de Antropologia e 
Historia171 to discuss whether the project should proceed.172 However, if the 
community does respond to the DCP, the DCP then helps facilitate the 
consultation between the ethnic community and the third-party planning to make 
use of the land.173 
The consultation phase begins with a pre-consultation meeting between the 
DCP and the ethnic group.174 The DCP presents information about consulta 
previa and the rights the group has.175 Together, the DCP and the group 
determines how the consultation will be “carried out.”176 The DCP also provides 
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information on the project to the ethnic community.177 The next step is for an 
actual consultation between the project investor or organization with the ethnic 
group. The DCP oversees the meeting. The purpose of the consultation stage is 
to create an agreement between the investor and the ethnic group.178 At this 
phase of the process, consultations often become frustrated due to an information 
imbalance between the ethnic community councils and the investor. Following 
the consultation stage, is the monitoring phase. At this stage, an agreement 
should already be in place and a monitoring process as well as a schedule for 
follow-up meetings should be determined.179  
With the ratification of the new constitution, the signing of the ILO 169 and 
the passing of Law 70, the Colombian government not only recognized Afro-
Colombians as a distinct group in Colombian society but also delineated specific 
rights for Afro-Colombians to preserve their culture and to protect their lands.180 
While these laws seemed like a step in the right direction towards ensuring Afro-
Colombians’ ability to enforce their collective property rights against interested 
actors who seek their land, these laws fall short and attacks on Afro-Colombians 
have persisted.181  
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT LAWS  
There are several factors that limit the protections that the current laws 
establish for Afro-Colombians, but this comment will discuss two main factors. 
First, Law 70 does not guarantee Afro-Colombians complete control over their 
lands because it does not provide Afro-Colombians with the ability to veto 
projects during the consulta previa process.182 Second, Colombia’s system of 
consulta previa was not established by a legislature and is a system of “scattered 
norms, guidelines, decrees, and presidential directives” that the Colombian 
government can ignore when it sees fit.183 These shortcomings provide avenues 
for corporate interests to triumph over the rights of Afro-Colombians.  
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A. Structural Problems with Consulta Previa  
Consulta previa does not provide insight as to what would occur if Afro-
Colombians veto a project. The Colombian version of consulta previa does not 
answer that question because neither ILO 169 nor Law 70 clearly address the 
possibility.184 Yet this question deserves to be answered because the lack of a 
veto limits the ability of Afro-Colombians to protect their cultural and territorial 
integrity.185 If Afro-Colombians are approached by a corporation with a project 
that will involve activities that they do not wish to allow on their lands and 
negotiations between the Colombian government, the corporation, and Afro-
Colombians are not successful, what can the Afro-Colombians do? They must 
continue to negotiate, and, as past actions show, the Colombian government 
tends to side with corporations.186 In fact, international law also tends to side 
with corporations in such negotiations maintaining that the exploitation of 
natural resources on Indigenous land by corporations is considered legal “as long 
as Indigenous rights to consultation, participation and redress . . . are met.” 187 
The inability to say no to a project reveals the consultation process for what it 
is—a façade.  
Ultimately, ethnic populations are faced with the choice between entering 
into a one-sided consultation process or refusing to participate and losing what 
little agency they do have. Corporations can play along when they see fit but 
know that at the end of the day, their deal will get done. How can Afro-
Colombians fully protect their lands if each consultation process essentially 
requires that the Afro-Colombians give their consent?  
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B. Problems with the Implementation of Consulta Previa 
Since the ratification of the ILO 169 and the enactment of Law 70, the 
Colombian government has failed to implement a clear structure of consulta 
previa.188 This lack of statutory structure allows the Colombian government to 
disregard consulta previa when it sees fit and leaves Afro-Colombians in 
danger.189 This section will discuss examples of when the Colombian 
government has engaged in activities that directly contradict consulta previa and 
aggravate the structural shortcomings that already exist. This section will also 
acknowledge the role that the Colombian Constitutional Court has played in 
ensuring that the Colombian government adheres to Law 70 and consulta previa. 
This section will then discuss how the current presidential administration has 
approached the land rights of Afro-Colombians.  
1. Contradictory Policies of the Colombian Government  
One government activity that directly contradicted the principles of consulta 
previa was the passage of Law 99, which created a national authority, el 
Ministero de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible.190 In addition to the creation of 
the environmental authority, the law also required consultation with ethnic 
communities prior to “granting environmental licenses whenever extractive 
projects . . . were expected to have an impact on ethnic communities.”191 The 
government also implemented decree 1320 in 1998 to regulate Law 99.192 The 
decree “provide[d] guidelines for analyzing the economic, environmental, 
social, and cultural impacts of natural resource extraction on Indigenous and 
Afro-descendant communities within their territories, and at the same time 
established a set of measures that would protect their integrity.”193 While all of 
these regulations seem to be for the benefit of ethnic communities, such as the 
Afro-Colombians, these regulations occurred without prior consultation from 
such communities,194 ignoring the objectives of consulta previa.195 
 
 188 Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22. 
 189 Id.; Adam Wolsky, Summary: The Perils and Promise of Consulta Previa, AS/COA (July 23, 2014), 
http://www.as-coa.org/articles/summary-perils-and-promise-consulta-previa. It is also important to note that the 
displacement of several Afro-Colombians makes it hard to correctly implement consulta previa since more than 
60% the Afro-Colombians who possess legal titles to collective lands are currently internally displaced and thus 
cannot contribute to the process. Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16. 
 190 See Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22. The English translation of el Ministerio de Ambiente y 
Desarrollo Sostenible is The Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development.  
 191 Id.  
 192 Id.  
 193 Id.  
 194 Id.  
 195 Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17.  
FUENTESCOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19 5/23/2019 10:08 AM 
422 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
In the 1990s, the communities of Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó began fighting 
for recognition of their collective right to ancestral land and for the protection of 
their territory.196 Oil palm investors and cultivators had taken lands in both 
Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó by harassing families to the point that they were 
forced to relocate. 197 In 2001, the communities in Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó 
were finally granted collective title to the lands they fled several years earlier.198 
Such declarations by the state granted the communities the privilege of taking 
part in the consulta previa process. However, formal recognition by the 
Colombian government as an ethnic community was not followed by restitution 
to their homes, and members of both communities remain displaced.199 Such 
treatment led to criticism from international organizations. The Inter-American 
Commission for Human Rights issued “provisional measures of protection upon 
learning that the harassment had not stopped.”200 Similarly, the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) found that the Colombian government violated 
consulta previa in its treatment of the communities in Curvaradó and 
Jiguamiandó, and the organization requested that the government fulfill the 
consultation requirement and “guarantee the restitution of the lands.”201 
Despite criticism from international organizations, from 2006 to 2010, the 
Colombian government continued to circumvent consulta previa to pass laws 
that would facilitate Colombia’s compliance with free trade agreements.202 The 
Forestry Law of 2006, the Rural Development Statute of 2007, and the reforms 
to the Mining Code of 2010 were all passed for the purpose of meeting the 
demands of free trade agreements,203 and all three legal measures had a direct 
impact on lands inhabited by ethnic communities.204 However, the Colombian 
government failed to comply with the mandate of consulta previa and never 
entered the consultation process with the affected communities.205  
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In 2006, the Colombian government also initiated the implementation of the 
National Plan for Territorial Consolidation, which seeks to establish a 
government presence in neglected areas.206 These areas were near to or 
“correlated” with territories inhabited by Afro-Colombians in the Pacific and 
other ethnic communities.207 However, neither Afro-Colombians nor any other 
ethnic community was consulted.208 Yet, these communities did suffer as a direct 
result of the plan. Several members of ethnic communities faced violent 
retaliation by guerrillas who were upset by the government’s presence.209 In 
Tumaco, six Afro-Colombians who were participating in the consolidated area 
program were killed by members of the FARC. 210 It is possible that retaliation 
could have been prevented, if the Colombian government communicated with 
the Afro-Colombian community and learned more about the tensions in the 
Pacific from their perspective.  
By ignoring its own rules, the Colombian government has engaged in 
policies that negatively impact Afro-Colombians. Such actions by the 
Colombian government contradict the objective of consulta previa as described 
by the ILO convention: to “guarantee [] respect of the territories and cultural 
integrity of peoples and communities.”211 
2. Protection of Consulta Previa by the Colombian Constitutional Court  
While the legislative and executive ramas212 of the Colombian Government 
continue to disregard consulta previa,213 the Constitutional Court has repeatedly 
upheld the doctrine and even strengthened its policies.214 Following the 1998 
passage of Decree 1320, the Constitutional Court held the enactment of the 
decree to be unconstitutional because the government violated consulta previa 
by failing to consult with the ethnic communities impacted by the decree.215 The 
Court also held the Forestry Law of 2006, the Rural Development Statue of 
2007, and the reform to the Mining Code of 2010, to all be unconstitutional on 
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similar grounds.216 The Constitutional Court also reestablished a prior decision 
where the Court explained that ethnic communities had a fundamental right to 
consulta previa, since consulta previa protects ethnic communities’ 
constitutional right of “social, economic, and cultural integrity.”217  
In 2011, the Court established some of the responsibilities of the Colombian 
Government in relation to consulta previa.218 The Court held that the 
government was “responsible for establishing a dialogue between parties based 
on good faith and agreeing to a flexible methodology, based on the particular 
needs of each community.”219 This decision also established that the consulta 
previa process should occur before operations displaced community 
members.220 To ensure that the government adheres to consulta previa, the Court 
also mandated that the certain watchdog government offices become involved 
in the consultation process.221 The Court has also requested that the government 
keep track of the abuses committed against Afro-Colombians, which the 
government has failed to comply with.222  
Despite the seeming indifference of all other branches of the Colombian 
Government to the multiple affronts to Afro-Colombian land rights and 
livelihood, the Constitutional Court seems to remain the sole government entity 
upholding the rights of Afro-Colombians.223 The Court’s role as the sole 
champion of consulta previa suggests that while there have been all too few real-
world examples of success, the legal principles guiding the process remain a 
source of hope for the future.  
3. The Future of Consulta Previa under President Santos 
While the Colombian executive and legislative branches in the past have 
tried to limit consulta previa, there have been some changes to how the current 
Colombian Government approaches consulta previa. The current President, 
Juan Manual Santos, has tried to strengthen his administration’s commitment to 
consulta previa. However, his efforts continue to fall short.224 President Santos 
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issued a directive which gave more responsibilities to the Directorio Consulta 
Previa and detailed a procedure for consulta previa.225 These procedural policies 
only detail how the government should proceed with the implementation of 
consulta previa and do not assist the communities who need to gain an even 
footing with the corporations who will be sitting on the other side of the 
bargaining table.226  
Furthermore, Santos’ administration seems to be more focused on 
streamlining the process of consulta previa to placate those who see the doctrine 
as a hurdle for economic development. Claudia Jimenez, director of the Sector 
de Minería a Gran Escala,227 noted that “some 7.3 billion in mining investment 
has been held up because of consulta previa” and other issues.228 Santos’ 
Comisión de Infraestructura229 attributed the deficiencies of the development of 
infrastructure to problems with implementing consulta previa.230 In an 
interview, the Vice Minister of the Interior, Luis Ernesto Gómez focused only 
on the time concerns with consulta previa, emphasizing a government desire to 
expedite the process.231 The preference for a speedy rather than effective 
consultation is yet another indication of the Colombian Government’s 
prioritization of economic development over the safety of ethnic communities. 
While the current administration seems uninterested in addressing the 
fundamental imbalance in bargaining power between the community councils 
and sophisticated profit-seeking entities during the consultation process, there 
have been some attempts to address past wrongs.232 The current administration 
has attempted to rectify the Colombian Government’s past policies towards 
Afro-Colombians, a clear example of which is The Victims’ and Land 
Restitution Law.233 The law seeks to “provide reparations for victims of the 
internal armed conflict and restore land to some five million [internally 
displaced peoples].”234 This policy would restore the rights of hundreds of Afro-
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Colombians who have had to leave behind their ancestral lands and move to 
urban areas due to the violence in the region.235 However, this policy has failed 
to mitigate the violence that continues to plague Afro-Colombians.236 Bands of 
guerrillas and bacrim are still present in the Pacific Region and are still fighting 
over land, and Afro-Colombians remain at risk.237 The law has yet to be fully 
implemented, yet there are already signs that it may be fundamentally flawed 
due to the lack of input from those the law seeks to protect.238 Around twenty 
land rights activists have already been murdered since it went into effect.239 
While the current presidential administration has taken some measures to 
revise consulta previa and address past wrongs,240 these measures have fallen 
short, as the administration does not seem to recognize the dangers that Afro-
Colombians continue to face.241 Nor does the administration respect the 
objectives of consulta previa, which aim to preserve and protect Afro-
Colombian cultural and territorial integrity even when considering economic 
development.242 Like most laws, consulta previa will only be as effective as 
those willing to enforce it. The Colombian government must take a 
fundamentally different approach to consulta previa; one focused on the 
mitigation of violence and the factors perpetuating violence. If not, the law will 
continue to serve corporate interests and Afro-Colombians will lack any viable 
avenue for safety and redress.  
IV. A POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENT TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The current protections for Afro-Colombian land do not grant Afro-
Colombians complete control over their lands and fail to provide a clear structure 
for adherence. These weak protections expose Afro-Colombians to further 
violence. Corporations and bacrim take advantage of the deficiencies in the 
system to swindle Afro-Colombians who choose to engage in negotiations or to 
physically remove Afro-Colombians from their lands. The Colombian 
government historically has played a role in supporting the desires of wealthy 
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landowners and corporations over the rights of Afro-Colombians. To ensure that 
Afro-Colombians can protect their land and culture from future attacks, Afro-
Colombians’ rights must be clearly established and respected. To do so, the 
Colombian government must work with Afro-Colombians to strengthen these 
policies. Otherwise, the perpetuation of violence will continue to negatively 
harm Afro-Colombians in all aspects of their lives.  
To create a better system of protection for Afro-Colombians and their land 
rights, the Colombian government should change four fundamental aspects of 
the consulta previa regime: first, the government should move away from the 
current loose legal framework of consulta previa and stop circumventing the 
process mandated by consulta previa; second, the government must actively 
communicate with Afro-Colombians prior to implementing policies that affect 
them; third, the government should use the UNDRIP as a blueprint for creating 
a broader scheme of legal rights for ethnic communities; and, fourth, the 
government must grant Afro-Colombians the ability to veto proposals from 
governmental and corporate entities seeking to use Afro-Colombian land.  
The first issue with the process is that consulta previa is only a loose system 
of “norms, guidelines, decrees, and presidential directives,”243 which makes it 
possible for actors to ignore consulta previa. The current system was not 
primarily established by the Colombian legislature, but by the Constitutional 
Court through a series of case holdings.244 The fact that most of the structure of 
consulta previa comes from case law has led to confusion among corporations 
on what the exact protocols and procedures are.245 This creates an avenue to 
neglect the system. For actors, such as corporations or bacrim, who simply 
refuse to comply with consulta previa, the weak system does not present enough 
consequences that will deter them from pursing their economic aspirations 
through other means, such as physical removal.246  
The lack of structure of consulta previa has also allowed the Colombian 
Government to further weaken the system by disregarding it. As discussed 
above, the Forestry Law of 2006, the Rural Development Statute of 2007, and 
the Mining Code of 2010 were all legal measure that had a clearly foreseeable 
impact on Afro-Colombian land.247 However, these measures were drafted and 
implemented without any apparent attempt to engage in consulta previa with 
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Afro-Colombians. This disregard in favor of economic development also 
provides dangerous encouragement to corporations by reassuring them that the 
Colombian government values business over the rights of Afro-Colombians. A 
particularly egregious example is the implementation of the National Plan of 
Territorial Consolidation.248 Throughout the decision-making process, the 
Colombian Government again failed to include Afro-Colombians who would 
clearly feel the impacts of the policy during the execution phase.249 This plan 
did, however, leave six Afro-Colombians participants dead.250   
While not all the measures necessarily exasperate the violence that Afro-
Colombians and their lands face, these actions demonstrate to other actors, such 
as corporations and bacrim that the protection of Afro-Colombians is not a 
priority for the Colombian Government. These measures show corporations that 
efforts such as consulta previa will take a backseat to economic development, 
and that they can continue to use Afro-Colombian land as they see fit.  
To ensure that the manipulation and disregard for Afro-Colombian land 
rights end, the Colombian Government needs to create a stronger system of 
consulta previa, and to stop engaging in policies that directly weaken the system 
which meant to keep Afro-Colombians on their lands.  
The second necessary step the government must make is to communicate 
with Afro-Colombians, especially when the Colombian Government is 
legislating or carrying out policies that involve Afro-Colombians. As stated 
previously, the Colombian Government has consistently refused to participate 
in the consultation process with Afro-Colombians when passing laws or issuing 
presidential directives.251 Afro-Colombians are better equipped to identify 
problems or tensions in the area.252 Communication with Afro-Colombians 
could prevent further disastrous results of policy initiatives by the Colombian 
government such as the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law. The Colombian 
Government should adhere to Law 70, which recognizes that Afro-Colombians 
have a constitutional right to consultation when outside actors use their lands,253 
and communicate with Afro-Colombians when creating policies that will affect 
them.254  
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The third change that the Colombian Government should adopt is to 
incorporate the UNDRIP principles into Colombian law. UNDRIP is an 
instrument initiated by the United Nations to end discrimination of indigenous 
people and ensure their protection.255 UNDRIP was adopted by the general 
assembly on September 13, 2007.256 While UNDRIP specifically applies to 
indigenous groups,257 since Afro-Colombians share a similar status to 
indigenous groups in Colombia, and the Colombian government could adopt an 
expanded version of the declaration that includes Afro-Colombians. The 
instrument would be useful in protecting Afro-Colombians because it is a “major 
step . . . for human rights,” as it provides for broader protections for indigenous 
groups.258 UNDRIP is non-legally-binding, but, despite its non-binding nature 
the Colombian government abstained from voting on the declaration in 2007.259  
The Colombian Government cited conflicting provisions within its 
constitution as a barrier to adopting UNDRIP outright. However, the Colombian 
Government should still use UNDRIP as a guideline and implement a law with 
similar protections for Afro-Colombians as those afforded to indigenous groups 
under UNDRIP. UNDRIP-style laws would provide stronger protections for 
Afro-Colombians than ILO 169, the treaty that the Colombian version of 
consulta previa is based on. The declaration holds that the forcible removal of 
indigenous people should never occur.260 The adoption of this proposal into 
Colombian law would send a clear signal to corporations and bacrim that past 
practices of violent removal will no longer be tolerated.  
UNDRIP also proclaims that States should obtain the free, prior, and 
informed consent of indigenous groups before “the approval of any project or 
legislative . . . measure that may affect them.”261 The passage of a law which 
contains a similar provision would limit the Colombian government’s ability to 
pass laws that affect Afro-Colombians without first consulting with Afro-
Colombians.  
The fourth—and most critical—change the Colombian Government must 
make is the creation of a legally binding veto power for Afro-Colombian 
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communities. Some legal scholars have also stated that the provisions in 
UNDRIP seem to provide a sufficient legal basis for granting indigenous groups 
a veto power.262 The Colombian Government; however, should move beyond 
UNDRIP and establish that Afro-Colombians have definite right to veto any 
proposed activity on their lands. The ability to reject certain projects would 
provide Afro-Colombians a chance to ensure the protection of their lands. If 
Afro-Colombians had a veto power, they would no longer be forced to remain 
in a negotiation process with corporations where completion of the project is a 
foregone conclusion. Afro-Colombian community councils would instead be 
able to withdrawal their approval and corporations would be legally bound to 
respect that decision. The creation of a legally binding veto power would also 
demonstrate to corporations, and to bacrim that the Colombian Government 
recognizes, and respects Afro-Colombian land and culture. Hopefully, this 
would end the practice of corporations hiring bacrim263 to openly remove Afro-
Colombians by force, without fear of legal consequences.  
These four proposals, if implemented, will deter further assaults on to Afro-
Colombian lands by corporations and bacrim, and, if not, these proposals will at 
least provide a vehicle for punishment if corporations or bacrim attempt to take 
Afro-Colombian land.  
V. CRITICISMS OF CONSULTA PREVIA 
While this Comment wishes to improve Colombia’s current implementation 
of Law 70 by strengthening its approach to consulta previa, there are several 
criticisms of the basic principles of consulta previa. This section will discuss 
two criticisms from the point of view of ethnic community leaders and one 
criticism from the point of view of corporations.  
Ethnic or indigenous leaders in other parts of Latin America have expressed 
frustration that consulta previa does not provide ethnic communities sufficient 
rights over their lands.264 Many projects which are presented to the communities 
are dealing with advanced engineering or technical issues, and negotiations are 
often couched in highly technical jargon. As a result, communities have no way 
of knowing the true extent to which those projects could harm their lands.265 
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This is a valid criticism that points out a real shortcoming of the consulta previa 
process, but is one that the Colombian Government can attempt to alleviate by 
providing more educational resources and technical guidance to Afro-
Colombians community councils. 
The second criticism leaders of ethnic communities have concerns the 
current structure of consulta previa, which is regulated by domestic 
governments and not international organizations.266 Community leaders argue 
that international regulation would provide more protections to indigenous and 
ethnic communities.267 Their national governments charged with representing 
these communities have repeatedly limited the protections granted in the original 
ILO 169.268 If the Colombian Government were to adopt the principles of 
UNDRIP into its domestic laws, this would expand the current set of protections 
towards indigenous and ethnic communities.  
Investors have also had problems with consulta previa due to the obstacles 
it creates for their projects. In Colombia, certain investors, continue to disregard 
Law 70 and the legal title of Afro-Colombians, and continue to forcibly take 
lands.269 For the investors who do wish to adhere to the law and participate in 
the consulta previa process, the disorder of the system and its complexities 
makes the process frustrating and difficult.270 Due to the disarray of the system, 
consulta previa is seen as a barrier to development by some.271 Yet, this problem 
could be addressed if the Colombian government were to create clear laws on 
consulta previa instead of relying on the loose jurisprudential standards created 
by the Constitutional Court.  
CONCLUSION 
With the passing of Law 70 and implementation of consulta previa, Afro-
Colombians have moved from being completely ignored by the Colombian 
government and have a defined role as a stakeholder in Colombia’s economic 
development projects in the Pacific Region. The promise of consulta previa is 
to provide a mechanism for Afro-Colombians to protect their territory, as well 
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as their cultural identity, while also allowing them to work with the Colombian 
government and future investors to take part in the project of Colombian 
economic development on their own terms.  
While Afro-Colombians in the Pacific Region now have some form of 
agency—in that they hold legal title to areas of vital importance to the 
Colombian economy, they continue to be ignored, abused, and abandoned by 
their government and fellow citizens. The Colombian government has failed in 
its implementation of the consulta previa regime. The government should ensure 
the protection and safety of Afro-Colombians as corporations and bacrim will 
continue to manipulate the process or illegally force Afro-Colombians off their 
own land.  
As the Colombian government makes strides in its relations with the FARC, 
other guerrilla groups, and paramilitary groups to end the half a century of 
bloodshed, it is vital that the government ensure that all brutal violence within 
its borders ends, so that all its citizens may share equally in the promise of peace. 
To do so, the Colombian government should establish a clear policy on consulta 
previa. Without a stronger system of consulta previa, Colombia will not be able 
to move beyond its violent history and Afro-Colombians will continue to be 
harassed and murdered.  
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